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ABSTRACT
Personally identifiable information (PII) is information regarding things such as
bank accounts, retirement or stock investment accounts, credit card accounts, medical
records, or insurance claims. There is a need to protect the PII in databases that are
connected to the ubiquitous, global network that is the Internet.

If there is any

vulnerability in the protection in a system that holds PII, then it presents an opportunity
for an unauthorized person to access this PII. One of the techniques available to wouldbe information thieves is SQL injection (SQL-I). In this project, a system is developed to
analyze the values submitted by users through HTML forms and look for possible attack
patterns. Once the system finds such a pattern, it blocks the attack and makes a record of
the activity. If an attacker continues to pass such attack patterns, the system blocks
access by this user altogether. A mechanism is included to block users who attempt to
log in at an abnormally high rate. This provides a combination of pattern-based detection
and anomaly-based detection to create a reasonably robust intrusion detection system,
with respect to SQL-I attacks.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Internet is a huge interconnected network, the largest in the world. In less
than two decades, it has grown from an esoteric academic medium to a ubiquitous source
of information. A great deal has been made about the accessibility of the Internet as well
as how it will supposedly change all of our lives. Computer files are replacing paper files
as electronic records in institutions such as hospitals, insurance providers, and banks are
quickly replacing their carbon-based counterparts. As they are getting used to the idea of
using it, people are going shopping and banking over the Internet. People are demanding
more and more access to the Internet – always wanting the information faster, more
constantly available, and increasingly diverse in content. Insurance providers are starting
to encourage employers, physicians, and insurance brokers to submit medical claims
information electronically in order to cut down on costs and improve turnaround time.[13]
With the growth of digital traffic, we are affording ourselves great convenience, but also
exposing ourselves to greater risk of having sensitive information intercepted or stolen.
Systems that contain sensitive information must have safeguards to prevent the risk of
external attacks on the system, for example with the use of some type of tool. We discuss
the development of a software tool in this paper.
Personally identifiable information (PII) can be found in bank accounts,
retirement or investment accounts, and credit card accounts.

The volume of this

information is often great as a result of institutions having so many customers and users.
Therefore, the ideal way to store and retrieve all of this information is in a database. To
satisfy people’s desire to access information from this database from anywhere at
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anytime, the natural network of choice is the Internet. The feature of having such
convenient access is precisely how we run into security issues. The Internet was first
created without security in mind, because it was not an issue at the time. It was a simple,
open way of communicating and sharing ideas in the academic setting. The modern
version of the Internet, however, is accessible by anybody including those with dubious
moral values. There needs to be protection of the PII in these databases. People want
their names, addresses, phone numbers, credit card numbers, and social security numbers
private and protected. Now, more than ever, we need to strengthen the security of the
systems which use these databases and make them secure.
One of the techniques available to the would-be information thieves is SQLInjection (SQL-I). SQL-I attacks involve a variety of methods, but the intention of an
attacker using it is to submit specially-chosen patterns when asked for the user’s
username and password on an internet form. The values passed from a form may be
directly concatenated into a string with an SQL query string. Then the resulting SQL
query string is dynamically parsed in order to test, for example, if the username and
password are correct. When the text from the user input is unchecked and incorporated
into the SQL query, these abnormal values can result in highly abnormal behavior such as
gaining access to the system despite not supplying the correct password, selecting
columns from completely different tables than the ones being queried in the original
query, or even highly dangerous behavior such as deleting any tables. It is therefore
imperative that these values be checked before being submitted to a database
management system (DBMS) parser to be run on the database.
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There are systems that have been developed to detect SQL-I vulnerabilities such
as Sania. Sania identifies vulnerabilities during development and debugging phases by
examining the SQL queries that occur between a web application and the database, and
generating elaborate attacks according the vulnerabilities it finds.[10] There has also been
work on tools such as AMNESIA which is a runtime SQL-I detection tool and JCrasher
which generates test cases, both of which are based in the Java language.[11]
Aside from these two tools, there are many other tools both academic and
commercial, such as CodeScan Labs: SQL-Injection, that identify SQL-I attack
vulnerabilities.[5] However, this paper will focus on detecting and blocking SQL-I attacks
at these vulnerable sites.
There is work done on using parse trees as a way of dynamically checking queries
for the presence of SQL-I attacks. However, this requires the comparison between the
structures of the SQL query before and after user input is incorporated into the dynamic
SQL query.[12]
However, a software system can be developed to intercept the values submitted
by users through HTML forms and look for these SQL-I attack patterns. This paper
focuses on software approaches, although there are hardware approaches as well. Once
the software system finds something that matches a SQL-I attack pattern, it makes a
record of this activity. If a person continues to submit such patterns, the system blocks
access of this user altogether. We also include in the system a mechanism to block users
who attempt to log in at an abnormally high rate. With this combination of pattern-based
detection and anomaly-based detection, we have a much more robust intrusion detection
system. The attacker will be greatly slowed down and once an attack is detected and
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reported, the system administrator will be given the chance to take steps to properly deal
with the attack. He may choose to block the attacker’s IP address, if it was not already
blocked. The system administrator may examine the attacker’s input and develop and
add more SQL-I signatures to be used to detect similar attacks in the future.
There are also a variety of different commercial tools which deal with SQL-I
attacks that are available. However, the ones studied in this paper are quite costly, or do
not apply to all DBMS’s, or are only useful for systems in development. The Intrusion
Detection and Prevention System (IDPS) described in this paper is a free, but is both
powerful and robust against SQL-I attacks on any system using any DBMS. When the
IDPS is in place and these steps are followed, then the valuable information contained in
the database, which may include PII information, will be properly protected.
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2. SQL
SQL (pronounced “S-Q-L”) is the high-level language used in numerous
relational database management systems. It was originally developed in the early 1970’s
by Edgar F. Codd at IBM and soon became the most-widely used language for all
relational databases. SQL is a declarative computer language which has elements which
include clauses, expressions, predicates, queries, and statements.[1]
What makes SQL so powerful is its immense flexibility and its ability to be
abstract. It allows a human being to use SQL to ask for what information he wants
without outlining how the information is to be retrieved. Thus, this relieves the user of
any programming knowledge needed to satisfy the query. In this sense, it is an even
higher “high level” language than most traditional programming languages such as C++
and Java.

A person with little to no programming background can still use SQL

effectively. However, SQL does include powerful features and functions that allow users
with programming knowledge to build complex queries and apply them to even more
powerful uses.
2.1 Background
Enterprise-scale applications over the Internet often have a need to authenticate a
large number of users, to retrieve specific information from a large warehouse of data, or
to save information for later retrieval by an application or an analyst. The amount of data
is so large, that it cannot be accomplished in-memory.

Therefore, these Internet

applications must make use of a database in the form of a database management system
(DBMS).

Internet applications often take data obtained from web pages and then

combine them directly into an SQL statement to be directly and dynamically parsed, and
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then processed by the DBMS. This allows powerful and effective queries to be written
quickly and easily.

In turn, these incorporated queries do jobs such as log in

authentication, and data storage and retrieval.
Flexibility is another strength of SQL’s. Similar to a true programming language,
SQL allows the inclusion of inline comments within the code, including between
statements. SQL allows pattern and regular expression matching of strings. [1] SQL also
enables users to concatenate and combine separate characters or values (such as from a
column or field of a record) to form a complete string. As it will be shown, it is the
flexibility of SQL syntax which primarily makes signature-based detection challenging.
SQL also has a UNION construct which allows the rows from different tables to
be selected simultaneously, as long as the columns are compatible types. This is a
powerful feature that opens up a new dimension in table selection and enables more
complicated aggregation. As with all power in the wrong hands, the UNION can be used
to do things beyond the intension of the database application designers and engineers. A
person may make use of all of these features and functionality in a way that is
unauthorized and dangerous by using SQL-Injection attacks.
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3. SQL-INJECTION
3.1

AND/OR Attack
Web programmers often take string values entered by an Internet user on a form

that represents user names and passwords and place them directly into the SQL statement
to be run against a database. A simple test SQL statement that may be used is the
following example.
SELECT username, password
FROM UserAuth
WHERE username = 'usernameFromForm'
AND password = 'passwordFromFrom';
In this example, the values usernameFromForm and passwordFromForm are the
literal values obtained from the form. The intent is using the username and password
obtained from the form to see if there is a matching username and password in the
UserAuth table. If any rows are returned, the user is authenticated. However, if the web
programmer is not careful and uses this method and the form values without checking
them, a hacker may instead pass arbitrary values that the programmer did not originally
anticipate. One such attack is the basic attack that involves the AND or OR logic in the
SQL predicate. The hacker can specify a valid username such as “John Doe” and then
specify the password as “' OR '1'='1” in the form. The final test SQL query that uses
these values will be:
SELECT username, password
FROM UserAuth
WHERE username = 'John Doe'
AND password = '' OR '1'='1';
Provided that “John Doe” is a valid user, the database will allow the hacker to
log-in and proceed as “John Doe”, because even though the password string is not empty
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(the first predicate), ‘1’=‘1’ is a valid predicate that will always return TRUE. Thus, the
hacker has just accessed the account without ever knowing the password, and now she
has full access to the victim’s information. The hacker does not need to know this is the
way the form data is used to construct the SQL statement; he or she just simply needs to
do several “probing” tests and see the messages returned to see if this is indeed the case.
If the attack does not succeed, the attacker simply moves on and tries another method. If
it succeeds, the DBMS will happily return the username and corresponding password; our
hacker now has unauthorized access to the database through that username.
3.2

Comments Attack
As mentioned before, SQL allows inline commenting within the SQL “code”.

This allows two variations of SQL-I comments attacks. One simple variation is assigning
username to be a valid username followed by comment characters. For example, we
assign username = “admin' --”. Then our SQL test query may look like the following.
SELECT username, password
FROM UserAuth
WHERE username = 'admin' --' AND password = 'anything';
Everything after the “--” in the WHERE clause will be ignored, so this will allow
the hacker to log in as “admin”! This is a method of using comments as a way of
ignoring the rest of the query.[2]
The variation of the comments attack is using comments as a way of obfuscating
the signature of any SQL-I attack to avoid detection. Therefore, the use of C-style
comments “/*” and “*/” can be combined with any of the previously discussed attacks as
a way of attempting to circumvent signature-based detection.

For example, if an

application searches a string passed from a form for the UNION keyword to attempt to
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catch UNION injection attacks (discussed in more detail in a subsequent section), an
attacker may choose to use comments to conceal this. For example, instead of using
“UNION ALL”, the attacker may instead use
'UNION /**/ALL'
or
'UN/**/ION A/**/LL'.
Both of these are synonymous with “UNION ALL” in the context of an SQL statement.
In addition to breaking up keywords, comments may be used in place of spaces.
A system using signature-based detection may miss keywords and SQL-I patterns
if it is not careful to also consider SQL-I Comments attacks as well.
3.3

String Concatenation Attack
SQL has an option to concatenate separate strings or characters to form complete

strings. This is accomplished using + or “double pipe” (||), or the function CONCAT
(such as in MySQL). These operations can be used to create a variation of the UNION
Injection attack by obfuscating the UNION keyword in a string concatenation operation.
For example, an attacker may use
‘UNI’ + ‘ON A’ + ‘LL’
in place of “UNION ALL” if he suspects the system looks for the UNION ALL
keyword.[2]
Another use of string concatenation in an attack is when the attacker suspects the
system searches for single quotes (‘). Then the attack may choose to use the CHAR()
function in conjunction with the string concatenation to issue characters indirectly
without using any single quotes. For example, an attack may use
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CONCAT(CHAR(65),CHAR(68),CHAR(77),CHAR(73),CHAR(78))
to represent ‘ADMIN’ so that the system will not find a single quote if it was looking for
them.
3.4

UNION Injection Attack
The UNION Injection attack may be the most dangerous, but certainly the most

surprising of the SQL-I attacks. This is because if it is successful, the UNION Injection
attack allows the attacker to return records from another table! For example, an attack
may modify the SQL query statement that selects from the user authentication table to
select another table such as the accounts table.
SELECT username, password FROM userAuth
UNION ALL
SELECT accountNum, balance FROM Accounts
The use of UNION ALL in this attack allows the attacker access to tables that the SQL
query statement was not originally designed for. The resulting rows selected from both
tables will appear on the resulting page.
The trickiness in this attack lies in the fact that the columns selected from the
second table must be compatible in number (the same number of columns as the original
table must be selected) and type. When trying to guess the correct number of columns,
the attack may simply keep trying to use different number of columns in each attempt
until he finds the right number. To match the type, the attack may try to try different
types until he stumbles upon the right one or he may simply choose to use NULL instead.
The IDPS system discussed later does not return any messages such as response or HTTP
status codes and limits internal information being broadcast externally as much as
possible.
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3.5

Hexidecimal/Decimal/Binary Variation Attack
Attackers can further try to take advantage of the diversity of the SQL language

by using hexadecimal or decimal representations of the keywords instead of the regular
strings and characters of the injection text. For example, instead of using the traditional
SQL-I Attack text
1 UNION
SELECT ALL
FROM WHERE
an attacker may substitute this with
&#x31;&#x20;&#x55;&#x4E;&#x49;&#x4F;&#x4E;&#x20;&#x53;&#x45;&#
x4C;&#x45;&#x43;&#x54;&#x20;&#x41;&#x4C;&#x4C;&#x20;&#x46;&#x5
2;&#x4F;&#x4D;&#x20;&#x57;&#x48;&#x45;&#x52;&#x45;
to attempt to avoid detection by signature-based detection engines.[7]
The system that does not look for hexadecimal or decimal characters will be
susceptible to this variation of the SQL-I attack.
3.6

White Space Manipulation Attack
Signature-based detection is an effective way of detecting SQL-I attacks. Modern

systems have the capacity to detect a varying number of white spaces around the injection
code, some only detect one or more spaces; they may overlook patterns where there are
no spaces in between. For example, the SQL-I pattern
' or 'a' <> 'b
can be re-written as
'or'a'<>'b
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containing no spaces in between. A DBMS SQL parser will be able to handle a variable
around all of white space characters or keywords. If a signature-based detection method
only takes into account the first pattern, it will completely overlook the second one.
In additional to the standard space character, white space characters also include
the tab, carriage return, and line feed characters.[7] To properly implement signaturebased detection, the system must be able to handle white space characters.
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4. EXISTING TOOLS
There are a number of existing tools available, both hardware and software based,
to deal with SQL-Injection attacks. Tools exist to detect SQL-Inj attacks while others try
to identify and fix SQL-Injection vulnerabilities. The following are a few software ones
we will discuss.
•

GreenSQL

•

dotDefender

•

CodeScan Labs: SQL-Injection

GreenSQL is a free Open Source database firewall that sits between the web
server and the database server and is used to protect databases from SQL injection
attacks. The logic is based on evaluation of SQL commands using a risk scoring matrix
as well as blocking known database administrative commands (e.g., DROP, CREATE,
etc).

Reports are generated on timestamp, query pattern, reason blocked (e.g., true

expression, has 'or' token). It has a white list of approved SQL patterns. However, only
MySQL database is currently supported.[3] In comparison, the IDPS in this project may
be used with any relational database, not just MySQL. The IDPS has both black and
white list pattern features.
Applicure’s dotDefender is a web application firewall that offers a SQL-Injection
solution. dotDefender is a multi-platform solution running on Apache and IIS web
servers. Central management ensures a single point of control and reporting for all
servers. There is an application layer firewall in front of web applications. It has a set of
security rules that enable it to be a powerful solution. However, the cost is prohibitive.
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The annual license costs $1,810 while a perpetual license is $3,995, which are both pricy
for personal use.[4] While dotDefender is an expensive product, IDPS is a free product.
Another product is CodeScan Labs’ SQL-Injection detection product. It has the
capability to scan web application source code that you selected for code syntax
vulnerabilities. It subsequently generates a "debug style" report. The speed depends on
how large the web application is and its complexity. The CodeScan software does not fix
the code, however; it only points out the issues. The company offers a 21-day free trial,
but normally it requires a yearly subscription to be maintained. The actual price is not
advertised and one must contact sales representative to find out the cost. A separate
activation key is required for different programming languages and additional
capabilities. [5]
Table 4-1 is a summary of the comparison of the different SQL-Injection
protection products described earlier.
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Product

IDPS

GreenSQL

dotDefender

How it
works

Evaluates form
data for known
SQL-Injection
attack patterns;
detects CGI
script attacks

Evaluates SQL
commands
using a risk
scoring matrix

Platform

PHP

Unknown

Application layer
firewall in front of
web applications;
uses a set of
security rules; uses
central
management for
single-point control
and reporting for all
servers; detects
SQL-I and crosssite scripting
attacks
Apache and IIS
web servers

Reports

Summary tables
and e-mail
Yes, by IP
Yes

Yes

Unknown

ASP with VBScript;
ASP.NET C#; PHP 3,
4 and 5
Unknown

Yes
Yes

Yes
Unknown

Yes
Unknown

Any

MySQL

Any

Any

Free

Free

Annual license =
$1,810; perpetual
license = $3,995.00

Yearly subscription =
price must be
inquired from sales
rep; need new
activation key for
different prog.
languages, additional
capabilities

Blocks
Black and
white lists
Databases
supported
Cost

CodeScan Labs:
SQL-Injection
Scanner runs on and
analyzes
development code for
cross-site scripting
and SQL injection
vulnerabilities

Table 4-1 A comparison of different SQL-Injection Protection products
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5. INTRUSION DETECTION AND PREVENTION SYSTEM (IDPS) DESIGN
5.1

Fundamentals
The system discussed is called the Intrusion Detection and Prevention System

(IDPS). The particular system discussed here is an extension of a particular system that
protects a web application system from CGI attacks.[6] However, the original system did
not guard against SQL Injection attacks directed at databases connected to the system.
We discuss how the SQL-I extension of the Intrusion Detection and Prevention System
works in more detail.
5.2

IDPS Detection Models
There are two models of detection used by this system.
•

Signature-based Detection Model

•

Anomaly-based Detection Model

A system that implements only one of these models is not as robust as a system that
utilizes a combination of them. The signature-based detection fails to detect unknown
attacks, while anomaly-based detection will detect unusual activity and behavior. This is
the reason why the Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS) makes use of both.
5.2.1

Signature-based (pattern) Detection Model
In the signature-based detection model, the input obtained from an HTML form is

compared to known SQL-I attack patterns (or signatures). If the input is found to match a
signature, access is denied and the user is given a generic invalid username/password
screen. We intentionally avoid returning a page with an HTTP response or status code
which will describe the error that occurred to the user. This is to limit the information
and feedback the IDPS system gives to would-be intruders. Even information that seems

20

perfectly harmless can unwittingly give hints about how our system works to attackers
which may help them to find a way to circumvent the system’s protections.[8] If a user
submits input that matches a known signature an arbitrary number of times, the user’s IP
is automatically blocked from accessing the system altogether. An administrator would
have to unblock the IP in order for this user to regain access.
The signatures themselves would have to be efficient, because a database that
contains too many signatures or inefficiently-written signatures would result in poor
performance. Also, the signatures would have to be chosen carefully, because we would
like to minimize the number of false positives returned.
The biggest flaw in the signature-based detection model is it cannot detect attacks
that are unknown. That is the reason the IDPS relies on the anomaly-based detection
model as a complement to the signature-based detection model.
5.2.2

Anomaly-based (behavioral) Detection Model
In the anomaly-based detection model, the number of times a user attempts to log

into the system, successful or not, is considered. If the attempts from a user exceed a
predetermined number, the system will lock out this user’s IP for a period of time. The
user may retry after this time has elapsed. It is important that this period and threshold be
arbitrary. This allows the system administrator to determine what the appropriate values
for each particular application are, since different systems have different requirements.
Anytime the system detects a possible attack, it makes a record of this attack and
may block an attacker from accessing the system any further. Furthermore, an alert may
be sent to the system administrator.
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While the IDPS is scanning for attacks, it makes a log of access attempts into the
system. This is critical, because if the system administrator wishes to determine if an
attack is being attempted at a later time, he has the option of looking back at the access
logs to see what input a suspected attack attempted to issue. The system administrator
may subsequently block the user if he determines the user was launching an attack on the
system. Furthermore, the system administrator or an analyst may examine the log to
learn what strategies and patterns the attacker used. This invaluable information may be
evaluated and used to develop new SQL-I attack signatures or tweak existing ones.

22

6.

IDPS DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

6.1 SQL-I Attack Detection
The IDPS system uses both signature-based and anomaly-based detection models
to identify threats and attacks on the system.

Signatures are carefully selected to

implement the signature-based model. Anomaly-based detection is based on the number
of times a user attempted to access the system, regardless of whether any SQL-I patterns
have been detected.
IDPS is case-insensitive while trying to use the signature-based detection method
to detect SQL-I attacks. The IDPS deals with White Space Manipulation attack by
removing any white space before comparing text with known SQL-I attack patterns. The
IDPS deals with Comments attack by looking for comment characters in the submitted
text. The String Concatenation attack is dealt with by looking for the concatenation
operation characters or CONCAT function. The keyword “UNION” is searched for by
the IDPS in case an attack tries to perform the UNION Injection attack. The system will
also look for binary, hexadecimal, and decimal characters in the submitted text to catch
instances of this SQL-I attack variation.

Sample patterns may be found in the

SQLI_PATTERNS table described in the IDPS database schema.
Even when no SQL-I attack pattern is detected in the submitted form text, the
IDPS monitors the frequency of the login attempts to implement the anomaly-based
detection method. When the number of visits has exceeded a predetermined threshold,
the system automatically blocks the visitor for a time.
It is significant to note that the screen the user sees when he or she has entered an
incorrect password or when an SQL-I pattern is detected in the text matches.
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No

feedback is communicated to the user as to whether or not the system has detected an
attack to ensure the system limits unnecessary information broadcast.
6.2 Storing and Blocking Attacks
Even when a text is deemed to not contain an SQL-I attack signature, the access
attempt along with user IP address and username and password issued is logged into the
VISITORS table. This table may be reviewed by the system administrator or an analyst
at a later time for possible attacks or new attack patterns. Normal users usually have a
more predictable number of login attempts, and this number may be determined by
observing everyday activity of these users. In their attempt to determine the weaknesses
of the system, attackers will attempt to access the system significantly more often. If a
user attempts to access to the system more than an arbitrary number over a predetermined
amount of time, which is stored in a value in the CONFIG table, this behavior is
suspicious and hence the user is a potential threat.

Thus, this user should be

automatically blocked for a certain amount of time. The user may attempt to access the
system after this period of time has elapsed. This block is recorded in the HACKERS
table with the reason “LIMIT_EXCEED” to serve as a permanent record.
If an SQL-I attack is detected, the user’s IP address, the text that matched the
SQL-I pattern, the browser the user was using, and the time of the login attempt are all
recorded in the HACKERS table as a permanent record. The attempt may be further
reported by the IDPS by the use of an e-mail notification.
A user who is detected to have submitted text that matches SQL-I attack
signatures are not immediately blocked. However, if the user submits text matching the
SQL-I attack signatures more than a predetermined number of times, a value which is

24

stored in a value in the CONFIG table, then several things occur.

The user is

immediately added to the blacklist table BLOCKED_HACKERS. Access to the system
is subsequently blocked. Finally, an alert in the form of an e-mail may be sent to the
system administrator. If desired, the system administrator may choose to restore access
to the blocked user at a later time.
6.3 Preprocessing form data before submission for processing
If a client login request passes all checks, before the IDPS passes the form data back
to

the

normal

login

authentication

system,

it

uses

the

PHP

function

mysql_real_escape_string() to be proactive and add an extra layer of protection. The
function mysql_real_escape_string() escapes special characters such as EOF chars,
quotes, backslashes, carriage returns, nulls, and line feeds in the value passed to it so that
it is safer to place it in a mysql_query().[9]
6.4 E-mail Notifications
The system administrator has the option to set up an e-mail address to received email alerts. The system administrator may adjust the exact e-mail address, the frequency
of the e-mails, and the type of activity he wishes to be notified of in the administration
panel.
6.5 Database Schema
The following is a listing of the database schema and tables used by the IDPS
described. The names of the tables are generic to allow easy understanding, but in a real
system, the table names may be obfuscated by renaming them to arbitrary names for
further security.
6.5.1

Table: BLOCKED_HACKERS
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Description: This is the IP “blacklist” table. Records the list of users to determine which
users are blocked when attempting to access the system. The table includes values for IP
masks, using % as the “wildcard” character.
Field
ip
timestamp

Type
varchar(50)
timestamp

Null
No
No

Default
None
CURRENT_TIMESTAMP

Table 6-1 BLOCKED_HACKERS table schema
6.5.2

Table: CONFIG

Description: Used to hold the arbitrary parameters for signature-based detection (type =
“AUTOBLOCK_IP_TRIES”) and anomaly-based detection (type = “LIMIT_HOUR” or
“LIMIT_DAY”).
Field
type
limitval

Type
varchar(20)
int(11)

Null
No
No

Default
None
None

Table 6-2 CONFIG table schema
Sample values for the CONFIG table are as follows:
type
LIMIT_HOUR
LIMIT_DAY
AUTOBLOCK_IP_TRIES

limitval
7
20
200

Table 6-3 Sample values for CONFIG table
6.5.3

Table: HACKERS

Description: Used to record the users detected to submit text that matches SQL-I attack
signatures during signature-based detection.
Field
id
ip
request
userBrowser
timestamp

Type
int(11)
varchar(50)
varchar(1000)
varchar(1000)
timestamp

Null
No
No
No
No
No

Default
None
None
None
None
CURRENT_TIMESTAMP

Table 6-4 HACKERS table schema
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6.5.4

Table: SQLI_PATTERNS

Description: Table which holds the SQL-I attack signatures.
Field
create_date
pattern

Type
timestamp
text

Null
No
No

Default
CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
None

Table 6-5 SQLI_PATTERNS table schema
Sample values for the SQLI_PATTERNS table are as follows:
create_date
10/22/09 11:28 PM
11/12/09 1:51 AM
11/12/09 1:41 AM
11/2/09 11:51 PM
4/1/10 3:35 PM
11/2/09 11:48 PM
11/2/09 11:24 PM
11/12/09 1:47 AM
11/12/09 1:51 AM
12/17/09 1:09 AM
12/17/09 1:09 AM
2/30/10 3:44 PM
2/30/10 3:46 PM
2/30/10 3:46 PM
2/30/10 3:44 PM
2/30/10 3:50 PM
5/01/10 1:23 AM
5/01/10 1:23 AM
5/01/10 1:24 AM
…

Pattern
'or'i'='i
\/\*
;
'or'[0-9a-z!@#$%^&*()\[\]{}]*'='[0-9a-z\[\]{}]*
&
\|\|
union
-\*\/
'or'a'<>'b
'or'[0-9a-z!@#$%^&*()\[\]{}]*'<>'[0-9az!@#$%^&*()\[\]{}]*
"
concat(
char(
+
admin
#
drop
create
…

Table 6-6 Sample values of SQLI_PATTERNS table
6.5.5

Table: VISITORS

Description: Records the users (visitors) that attempt to access the system. Users are
recorded into this table regardless if there is an SQL-I attack pattern detected.
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Field
id
ip
username
userBrowser
timestamp

Type
int(11)
varchar(50)
varchar(100)
varchar(1000)
Timestamp

Null
No
No
No
No
No

Default
None
None
None
None
CURRENT_TIMESTAMP

Table 6-7 VISITORS table schema
6.5.6

Table: IP_WHITELIST

Description: This is the IP “white list” table. Records the list of users to determine which
users are always allowed access when attempting to access the system.

The table

includes values for white list IP masks, using % as the “wildcard” character.
Field
ip
timestamp

Type
varchar(50)
timestamp

Null
No
No

Default
None
CURRENT_TIMESTAMP

Table 6-8 WHITELIST table schema
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7. IDPS COMPONENTS AND INTERFACE
The system designed and implemented in this project is a complete IDPS which uses
a combination of the signature-based detection model and the anomaly-based detection
model. To detect attacks, the IDPS contains a list of signatures. The system contains the
following crucial components to provide the complete web server security against the
SQL-I attacks.
7.1

Graphical User Interface
The system provides a browser-based interface for the server administrator to monitor

the system for possible attacks. The administrator can review occurrences of attacks,
block IP addresses, unblock IP addresses, and other actions on the GUI. The GUI
contains the following interfaces.

7.1.1

SQL-I Attacks (Administrator’s) Console

The interface named “SQL-I attacks” lists all past attacks detected by the IDPS with
the most recent ones listed first. This interface contains a table of attacks which contains
the following attributes:
•

Attack ID (iterative)

•

Attacker’s IP address linked to “Attacker History” interface

•

The login name or password issued to perform the attack

•

Browser that was used in the attack

•

Timestamp of when the attack was detected

Clicking on an IP address entries takes you to the “Attacker History” interface page
displaying the attack history of the clicked IP address. At the top of the page, there are
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links to the “Blocked Attackers” page and “phpMyAdmin” interface. Figure 7-1 contains
the screenshot of “CGI Attacks” interface.

Figure 7-1 IDPS SQL-I Attacks (Administrator’s) Console Interface

7.1.2

Attacker History Interface
Clicking the IP address of the attack from the Attackers page brings up the

“Attacker History” Interface page. The results on this page contain the attack history of
the attacker. Information contained on this page include:
•

Attacker’s IP address

•

Total number of attacks that were detected

•

“Block IP” button that blocks the IP address from accessing the server

Figure 7-2 illustrates this interface.
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Figure 7-2 IDPS Attacker History Interface
Clicking on the Block IP button on the “Attacker History” interface page blocks
the IP address from accessing the system and then immediately displays the “Blocked
Attackers” interface page to the administrator.
7.1.3

Blocked Attackers Interface
If the system administrator blocked an IP from the Attacker History page, or if he

clicked the “Blocked Attackers” link at the top of the page of most interfaces, then he
will see the “Blocked Attackers” interface page.
The following are the attributes that are displayed on this page:
•

the IP address blocked

•

the timestamp of the block

•

the option to unblock this IP address

Figure 7-3 illustrates this interface.
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Figure 7-3 IDPS Blocked Attackers Interface
7.1.4

Block IP Address Mask Interface
In some cases where the system administrator suspects an attacker has a dynamic

IP address, he may choose to block an entire subset of IP addresses. This is useful when
the System Administrator detects an attack from a range of IP addresses and wishes to
block the entire range.
Click on the Block IP Address Mask link at the top. In the resulting page, you
will see the “Block IP Address Mask” interface. The following are the attributes that are
displayed on this page:
•

the IP address mask blocked

•

the timestamp of the mask block

•

the option to unblock this IP address mask

Next to IP mask pattern textbox, enter the pattern with % or * as the wildcard
character. Finally, click the “Block IP mask” button to block the IP mask pattern. A
message will then appear confirming the addition of this IP address mask to the list.
7.1.5

IP Address White List Management Interface
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It is possible the system administrator wishes to designate IP addresses that he
never wishes to be blocked by the IDPS system. These may be IP addresses from trusted
locations, organizations, or individuals. Click on the White List Management link at the
top. In the subsequent page, type in the IP address in the text box, then click on the “Add
to White List” button to add the address to the white list. A message then appears to
confirm that the IP address was added to the white list.
7.2

MySQL Database
MySQL is the DBMS that manages the tables that record login activity, attacker

activity and history, SQL-I attack patterns, and IP address black and white lists.
7.3

Management Module
The management module is the primary component in the IDPS. It acts as the

verification layer that checks the data that is passed between the web page form and the
database.
7.4

E-mail Generation
Every time an SQL-I attack incident is detected, an e-mail is generated and sent to

the administrator to ensure that the administrator is always kept informed about the
attacks. The administrator can then choose to log into the system to perform further
investigation into the suspicious activity and block the user. The e-mail contains the
following information in the message:
•

The IP address of the attacking machine

•

The text used in the SQL-I attack

•

The web browser used to perform the attack

Figure 7-4 below illustrates what the notification e-mail may look like.
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Subject: "System alert: SQL-I pattern detected and logged"
From:
SQL-I Detection System <varian@mail.com>
To: "varian@yahoo.com" <varian@yahoo.com>
Notice: A user with IP address 127.0.0.1 has
entered a username/password matching an SQL-I
pattern. This activity has been logged.
------------------------------------------------Details: Timestamp: = Sat Apr 10 8:44:36 UTC 2010
IP address = 127.0.0.1
username = ;
password = passw
Figure 7-4 Sample IDPS System Notification E-mail
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8. IDPS REQUEST HANDLING FLOW CHART
When the form data is submitted to the web server, the data is forwarded to the
SQL-I Intrusion Detection and Prevention System. The login attempt information —
such as visitor IP address, time of login, and login username and password — is stored in
the IDPS database for future reference. The IDPS checks to see if the visitor is on the
Trusted List (also called the “white list”). If so, then the username and password is
passed through the mysql_real_escape_string function to clean up the escape characters,
and then processed normally. Otherwise, the IDPS checks to see if the visitor is marked
Blocked (also called on the “blacklist”). If the visitor is, an error page is returned and the
visitor is denied access to the system.
The IDPS will continue to check if the client attempting to log in has exceeded
the threshold allowed per the time period on the system. If yes, then an error page is
returned and the visitor is denied access temporarily.
Next, a scan of the submitted form text for SQL-I attack patterns is performed. If
no attack pattern is found, then it is filtered using mysql_real_escape_string and
processed normally. If an attack pattern was found, then the attacker’s information is
recorded into the database. If the occurrences of an attack are less than a threshold, then
filter and process the data normally. However, if it is greater than the threshold, then the
attacker information is stored in the database, the attacker is blocked indefinitely, an email is sent to the system administrator, and an error page is displayed.
Figures 8-1a and 8-1b are flow charts that show how requests are handled by the
IDPS, and how it intercepts and handles an SQL-I attack event.
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Submit form

Form data is forwarded to
SQL-I IDPS

Store visitor and visit into
database

YES

Process Normally

YES

Display Error Page and
Deny Access

YES

Display Error Page and
Deny Access Temporarily

NO

Is the Client on the
Trusted List?

NO

Is the Client marked
Blocked?

NO

Is the Client attempting to
log in too often?

Figure 8-1a IDPS Request Handling Flow Chart
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Scan for attack patterns

NO

Process Normally

NO

Process Normally

YES

Attack Pattern
Found?

Store attack information into
database

YES

Attack occurrences
exceed threshold?

Store attacker information into
database as Blocked

Notify the system administrator
via E-mail

Display Error Page and
Deny Access Indefinitely

Figure 8-1b IDPS Request Handling Flow Chart (continued)
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9 RESULTS AND OUTCOMES
The IDPS was tested by attempting to submit various known SQL-I attack
patterns using a “test plan”. The system successfully blocked the attacks and sent e-mail
notifications to the server administrator. The system was tested on its ability to block and
unblock attackers. Figure 9-1 and 9-2 illustrates one of these attempts to pass a username
with a known SQL-I attack pattern and the resulting page that looks like a mundane
invalid username/password page.

Figure 9-1 Login Page with SQL-I Attack Pattern
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Figure 9-2 Resulting Error Page with Invalid Username/Password Message

A wide variety of input representing the different types of SQL-I attacks is
determined and incorporated into a test plan that will be used to test the IDPS system.
After running the complete test plan, we will determine the relative effectiveness and
possible weaknesses of the IDPS in detecting SQL-I attacks on the system.
9.1 Test Plan and Results
The test plan consists of test cases, each of which contains a different input for the
IDPS system, and represents a particular type of SQL-I attack pattern that may be used to
attack the system. Each of these will be issued against the system. Then, the output and
results will be recorded in the system to be analyzed and determine how effective the
IDPS is. A brief excerpt of the test cases and results are outlined in table 9-3.
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Username input
admin
admin
admin

Password
input
' OR '1'='1
' OR '0'<>'1
’OR’1’=’1

Result
Blocked
Blocked
Blocked

admin

'OR'0'<>'1

Blocked

admin'-admin'#
admin'/*
' or 1=1-' or 1=1#
' or 1=1/*
') or '1'='1-') or ('1'='1-/*!32302 10*/
10; DROP TABLE members -10; DROP TABLE hackers2; /*

Blocked
Blocked
Blocked
Blocked
Blocked
Blocked
Blocked
Blocked
Blocked
Blocked
Blocked

admin'); drop table hackers2; --

abcd
abcd
abcd
abcd
abcd
abcd
abcd
abcd
abcd
abcd
*/ OR 'abcd'
<> '
abcd

Blocked

Comments

admin'--

' OR '1'='1

Blocked

UNION

' UNION SELECT 1, 'anotheruser', 'doesnt
matter', 1-' UNION select all from dummy --'
' UNI' + 'ON' + ' select ''test'' from dummy'

abcd

Blocked

abcd
abcd

Blocked
Blocked

' UNI' || 'ON' || ' select ''test'' from dummy'

abcd

Blocked

CONCAT(CHAR(65),CHAR(68),CHAR(77),
CHAR(73),CHAR(78))
' UNI/*breakUpThisKeyword*/ON select
''test'' from dummy'

abcd

Blocked

abcd

Blocked

abcd

Blocked

UnIoN

Blocked

Attack Type
AND/OR
AND/OR
White Space
Manipulation
Variation of
AND/OR
White Space
Manipulation
Variation of
AND/OR
Comments
Comments
Comments
Comments
Comments
Comments
Comments
Comments
Comments
Comments
Comments
Comments

UNION
String
Concatenation
String
Concatenation
String
Concatenation
Comments
variation of
UNION
Hex/Bin/Dec

Caseinsensitivity,
white-space
manipulation

&#x31;&#x20;&#x55;&#x4E;&#x49;&#x4F;&
#x4E;&#x20;&#x53;&#x45;&#x4C;&#x45;&#
x43;&#x54;&#x20;&#x41;&#x4C;&#x4C;&#x
20;&#x46;&#x52;&#x4F;&#x4D;&#x20;&#x5
7;&#x48;&#x45;&#x52;&#x45;
admin

Table 9-3 Test Plan and Results Sample
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9.2 Conclusion from Test Plan Results
A range of attack patterns were tested against the system according to the test plan
outlined above. When sending an attack pattern to the server, the web server is able to
successfully prevent the attack, log the attack entry in the database, and notify the
administrator of the attack through e-mail. Further attacks are not possible because the
attacker’s IP address is subsequently blocked.
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10 FUTURE WORK
The IDPS for SQL-I attacks was inspired by the future work listed by another
thesis project that focused on CGI-script attacks.[6] Future consideration may be further
extensions to the IDPS as suggested by this author.
•

PHP-related attacks
An extension to handle PHP attacks may be added to the system.

•

Protection for accessing private documents
An extension may be added to the IDPS to monitor and block attempts to
access private documents on the system. The administrator of the system may
choose which documents should be considered private.

•

SQL-I IDPS that automatically learns from previous attacks
It is conceivable that the SQL-I IDPS system can be programmed to take
patterns from known attacks and automatically determine patterns that may be
useful in preventing future attacks that use the same strategy. This feature
will be a analytical engine that “learns” from past attacks.

•

Dealing with dynamic IPs
It is possible that an attacker is able to change IP addresses. Then our system
will not be able to block all the IP addresses that the attacker is able to use.
IDPS will be much more effective if it is able to deal with attackers that
change their IP addresses.
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11 CONCLUSION
This paper describes the challenges that Internet applications that make use of a
database system face in terms of security and protection the private data. SQL-I attacks
is a legitimate threat that endangers the confidentiality of data and may cost an
organization a great deal of money and even their reputation.
Four different tools. The IDPS system developed for SQL-I attacks, when used
properly, is an inexpensive and effective deterrent to hackers.

It combines both

signature-based detection and anomaly-based detection methods to effectively create a
robust, secure system from SQL-I attacks. It is customizable and has the flexibility to be
tuned to match the usage and needs of the system the IDPS protects. When combined
with the original CGI-Script attack protection feature, the system is significantly safer
from both online threats.
As long as PII is available on the Internet and cyber criminals can benefit from
obtaining this information, there will be constant need to protect it.
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